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Seeking 'Common Ground:'
A Secular Statement
by BRUCE LEDEWITZ*
We are asked to recognize the existence of a practice of nonsectarian
prayer, prayer within the embrace of what is known as the Judeo-
Christian tradition.... If common ground can be defined which
permits once conflicting faiths to express the shared conviction that
there is an ethic and a morality which transcend human invention,
the sense of community and purpose sought by all decent societies
might be advanced. But though the First Amendment does not allow
the government to stifle prayers which aspire to these ends neither
does it permit the government to undertake that task for itself.
- Lee v. Weisman
Introduction
The above quotation comes from Justice Anthony Kennedy's
majority opinion in Lee v. Weisman,' the decision that prohibited
prayer at public high school graduations.! In context, Justice
Kennedy was considering the constitutionality of "nonsectarian
prayer,"' which he apparently defined as prayer that expresses a
conviction supporting morality' that transcends human invention. His
* Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law; B.S.F.S. Georgetown, 1974; J.D.
Yale School of Law, 1977. This essay was prepared with the support of the Duquesne
University School of Law Summer Writing Program.
1. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589 (1992).
2. Id.
3. Although Lee is widely treated as deciding the issue of prayer at public high
school graduations, and although there is language to that effect in the opinion, the facts in
Lee involved a middle school graduation. Id. at 580.
4. Id. at 589 ("We are asked to recognize the existence of a practice of nonsectarian
prayer, prayer within the embrace of what is known as the Judeo-Christian tradition,
prayer which is more acceptable than one which, for example, makes explicit references to
the God of Israel, or to Jesus Christ, or to a patron saint.").
5. The distinction between ethics and morality, whether one is the systematic study
of the other, is not germane to this paper. Justice Kennedy implied a distinction between
them in the quotation above by using two terms, but any distinction he was thinking of did
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conclusion was that while government may not suppress such prayer,
neither may government itself undertake it, through, in this case,
inviting clergy to a graduation ceremony and assisting in the creation
of the prayer through guidelines given to the speaker.
My purpose in this paper is to concentrate on Justice Kennedy's
reference to morality that transcends human invention in order to
clarify just what the Establishment Clause prohibits. The question is,
does the Establishment Clause prohibit a government proclamation
that there exists an objective morality that transcends human
invention?
Of course, Justice Kennedy's opinion in Lee was influenced by
matters other than the issue of morality, such as the concept of God,
the meaning of prayer and the threat of coercion. I will take up each
of those in turn. But I will concentrate on morality transcending
human invention, which, simply for convenience, I will also refer to as
objective morality. I don't intend by this change in terminology to
put any rabbits in any hats. The idea has many names. In an
upcoming book, I refer to the higher law tradition. By the term
"objective," I just mean transcending human invention.
We should first notice that Justice Kennedy was assuming in this
quotation that the nonsectarian prayer in the case had something to
do with objective morality. Since both prayers at issue were
addressed to God and asked for God's blessing, this is by no means
obvious.' Justice Kennedy could have addressed the prayers as
not turn out to matter in the opinion. I am using the term morality here in the
conventional sense of norms by which we ought to live.
6. Lee, 505 U.S. at 589 ("But though the First Amendment does not allow the
government to stifle prayers which aspire to these ends, neither does it permit the
government to undertake that task for itself.").
7. BRUCE LEDEWITZ, CHURCH, STATE, AND THE CRISIS IN AMERICAN
SECULARISM (forthcoming 2011).
8. Rabbi Leslie Gutterman's Invocation and Benediction were as follows:
INVOCATION
God of the Free, Hope of the Brave:
For the legacy of America where diversity is celebrated and the rights of
minorities are protected, we thank You. May these young men and women
grow up to enrich it.
For the liberty of America, we thank You. May these new graduates grow
up to guard it.
For the political process of America in which all its citizens may participate,
for its court system where all may seek justice we thank You. May those we
honor this morning always turn to it in trust.
For the destiny of America we thank You. May the graduates of Nathan
Bishop Middle School so live that they might help to share it.
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assertions about the existence of God, rather than as saying anything
about morality as such. The case could have been decided on the
basis of God-language.
Second, and crucially for my purposes, Justice Kennedy treated
objective morality as an open question. If there is objective morality,
then a sense of community might be fostered. When I first read this
quotation years ago, I remember being shocked that a Supreme Court
Justice would so readily treat objective morality as a question. I
assumed that for most people, the existence of objective morality is
taken for granted.
I think Justice Kennedy treated objective morality as a question
because he was assuming that morality that transcends human
invention is a religious formulation; indeed in context, the acceptance
of such morality is a project that our religions, specifically Judaism
and Christianity, are engaged in fostering. That is why Justice
Kennedy referred to "prayers which aspire to these ends," that is,
prayer that seeks to promote objective morality, rather than simply
prayer that "expresses" such morality. That is why he referred to the
"conviction" that there is such morality as something that our faiths
share. Apparently, for Justice Kennedy, objective morality is
something that religion allows us to believe in, but which remains a
mere aspiration.
From the perspective of the Establishment Clause, if the
assertion that objective morality exists-is real-is a uniquely
religious assertion, then its promotion by government might well be
barred by the Constitution. On the other hand, if a commitment to
May our aspirations for our country and for these young people, who are
our hope for the future, be richly fulfilled.
AMEN
BENEDICTION
O God, we are grateful to You for having endowed us with the capacity for
learning which we have celebrated on this joyous commencement.
Happy families give thanks for seeing their children achieve an important
milestone. Send Your blessings upon the teachers and administrators who
helped prepare them.
The graduates now need strength and guidance for the future, help them to
understand that we are not complete with academic knowledge alone. We
must each strive to fulfill what You require of us all: To do justly, to love
mercy, to walk humbly.
We give thanks to You, Lord, for keeping us alive, sustaining us and
allowing us to reach this special, happy occasion.
AMEN.
Lee, 505 U.S. at 581-82.
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objective morality is something that both believers and nonbelievers
share, or at least in principle could share, then it is not clear why
government may not promote it, argue for it, teach it, indeed establish
it, non-coercively, without violating the Establishment Clause.
In this paper, I hope to show the role that objective morality
played in the Lee opinion and thereby to suggest that the
commitment to objective morality is not uniquely religious. Whether
there is such morality is a question that all human beings, secular and
religious, must address. But I begin in Part I with a different
question: how did morality come to be an issue in Lee?
I. The Role of Objective Morality in Lee
It is certainly a plausible interpretation of the Establishment
Clause that it forbids government from endorsing the claim that
something like the God of monotheism exists. Since the prayers at
issue in Lee invoked the God of monotheism, why did Justice
Kennedy go beyond that fact in holding that high school graduation
prayers instigated by the government are prohibited? Why not
prohibit such prayers simply because they are addressed to God?
Before considering that option, which Justice Kennedy could
have pursued in his opinion, I must explain what I mean by God. I
will argue later in this piece that some assertions that utilize God-
language are not religious. So, I have to be very clear here about
what I mean by the "God of monotheism," which by all accounts is a
religious term. Jerome Stone defines "naturalism" in the phrase
"religious naturalism," as the assertion that there "seems to be no
ontologically distinct and superior realm (such as God, soul or
heaven) to ground, explain, or give meaning to this world."' In terms
of belief in the God of monotheism per se, I mean the belief that
there is an ontologically distinct singular intelligence or will that
grounds, explains and gives meaning to this world. I add intelligence
or will despite obvious difficulties with those terms because the
biblical account of God seems necessarily to require the capacity for
intentional action.
Justice Antonin Scalia has argued for the permissibility of
government acknowledgment of the God of monotheism in a
genuinely religious sense. The "God of monotheism" is the phrase
Justice Scalia used in his dissent in McCreary County, Kentucky v.
9. JEROME A. STONE, RELIGIOUS NATURALISM TODAY 1 (2008).
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American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky'o to describe the God to
which the American people are entitled to "give.. . thanks and
supplication as a people, and with respect to our national
endeavors."" I include singularity and the capacity for intentional
action in my definition of God because I agree with Justice Scalia that
the God of monotheism must be distinguished from "God or the gods
[who] pay no attention to human affairs." 2
Mine is not an adequate definition of God, of course. I am aware
that to argue that God exists has been said to deny Him. 3 I am
merely attempting here to establish a benchmark with which to
measure the reach of the Establishment Clause. The assertion that
the God of monotheism is real and acts in some sense in the world is a
uniquely religious claim. Although Justice Scalia has argued that
government may endorse the God of monotheism, he does not
dispute that the claim such a God exists is a religious claim. Indeed
he seems to agree that it is the kind of religious claim the
Establishment Clause otherwise prohibits government from making.
That conclusion follows from Justice Scalia's assertion that the
government is prohibited from "specifying details upon which men
and women who believe in a benevolent, omnipotent Creator and
Ruler of the world are known to differ." 4 For Justice Scalia, the
government may only go so far as to establish the God of monotheism
(and even in that instance may not do so in any coercive way).
Justice Scalia's reasons for making an exception for public belief
in, and indeed worship of, the God of monotheism need not detain us
here. Essentially, he has said that "[o]ur national tradition"" has
resolved the issue in favor of the permissibility of government
assertions addressed to the God of monotheism. In Justice Scalia's
view, since the founding generation acknowledged and thanked the
God of monotheism and since we as a nation have consistently done
10. McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 894 n.3 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
11. Id. at 900 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 893 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
13. PAUL TILLICH, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 205 (1951) ("God does not exist. He is
being itself beyond essence and existence. Therefore to argue that God exists is to deny
him.").
14. Lee, 505 U.S. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
15. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 900 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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so since, public ceremonies and symbols honoring and worshiping
that God are constitutional.16
The cases that permit government use of God-language, such as
Marsh v. Chambers," which upheld legislative prayers against
Establishment Clause attack, do not support Justice Scalia's position
and he would not claim that they do. These cases do not go so far as
to permit the government genuinely to assert that God exists. Such
uses of God-language are actually upheld in the case law on the
ground that they have no genuine current religious content. They are
referred to, for example, as ceremonial deism" or as historical
formulations.1 9 In fact, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor once went so
far as to say that such practices would not be permitted if they
induced a penitent state of mind.20
Justice Kennedy apparently supports the existing precedent and
does not agree with Justice Scalia that government may endorse the
God of monotheism. The opinion that most recently espoused Justice
Scalia's view, Part I of his dissent in McCreary County, was joined by
Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Clarence Thomas.
Tellingly, Justice Kennedy joined only the rest of this dissent, which
did not make the assertion that the God of monotheism may be
worshipped in government-sponsored ceremonies.21
But, if Justice Kennedy believes that the government may not
assert that God exists and may not engage in acknowledgment and
worship of that God, and if his position is in turn supported by case
law, then why did the Lee opinion not simply condemn the prayers at
issue in the case for their theocentric content? Why write about
objective morality at all?
The answer to that question is that Justice Kennedy was
addressing a dispute among the lower court judges in Lee concerning
whether the Establishment Clause issue in the case should be
restricted to the references to God in the prayers at issue. In holding
16. Id. at 886-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
17. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
18. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692-93 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
19. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 n.21 (1962).
20. Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 40 (2004) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("Any statement that has as its purpose placing the speaker or listener in a
penitent state of mind, or that is intended to create a spiritual communion or invoke divine
aid, strays from the legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing an event and recognizing a
shared religious history.").
21. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 848.
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that the prayers in Lee violated the Establishment Clause, District
Court Judge Francis Boyle specifically noted that if the word "God"
had been left out of the prayers, "the Establishment Clause would not
be implicated."22 Judge Boyle even rewrote the benediction that was
given to illustrate what it would have looked like without the
references to God.3
In the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Judge Juan
Torruella's majority opinion for the panel limited itself to agreeing
with Judge Boyle's holding, thus deciding only that graduation
prayers invoking God violate the Establishment Clause.24 Though
Judge Hugh Bownes concurred in the majority opinion, he expressly
rejected Judge Boyle's conclusion that a graduation prayer without
the word "God" would be constitutional. That would be "too literal
and narrow an interpretation of prayer and what is acceptable under
the Constitution."25 Prayer is what is unconstitutional, whether God
is directly mentioned or not.
Judge Levin Campbell dissented and would have allowed the
prayers at issue in the case. Nevertheless, he took issue particularly
with Judge Bownes concerning a prayer that did not mention God.26
Justice Kennedy noted this disagreement in his opinion.27 It
seems, therefore, that Justice Kennedy decided to go beyond the
prohibition of God-language in graduation prayers in order to try to
address and resolve this controversy in the lower courts. By resolving
the issue of graduation prayer even if such prayers do not use the
word "God," Justice Kennedy was giving guidance to the lower courts
and was attempting to prevent future disputes over relatively minor
differences in language in high school graduation prayers.
Henceforth, even graduation prayers that did not mention the word
"God," or refer to any deity, would still be held to violate the
Establishment Clause.
22. Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68, 74 (D.R.I. 1990).
23. Id. at 74 n.10.
24. Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990) ("The issue presented for review is
whether a benediction invoking a deity delivered by a member of the clergy at an annual
public school graduation violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the
Constitution as construed by the Supreme Court under the second prong of the Lemon
test.").
25. Id. at 1097 (Bownes, J., concurring).
26. Id. (Campbell, J., dissenting) ("It is difficult to see why this would violate the
Establishment Clause.").
27. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586 (1992).
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A second ground of decision in Lee that would not have
implicated objective morality and on which Justice Kennedy could
have rested, and did to some extent, was the coercion implied by
participation at a high school graduation. The government argued
that there was a lack of coercion in the case because high school
graduation ceremonies are voluntary. Justice Kennedy rejected this
argument with some scorn: "to say a teenage student has a real choice
not to attend her high school graduation is formalistic in the
extreme."2 8 There was coercion at the graduation.
Yet, coercion ultimately did not play a key role in Lee, and could
not. To see this, consider Justice Kennedy's response to a potential
objection to the holding that graduation prayers are
unconstitutional-"the profound belief of adherents to many faiths
that there must be a place in the student's life for precepts of a
morality higher even than the law we today enforce." In response,
Justice Kennedy acknowledged that "religious values, religious
practices, and religious persons will have some interaction with the
public schools and their students." 29 But this would have to happen as
a matter of voluntary accommodation. In contrast, in this case, "[t]he
sole question presented is whether a religious exercise may be
conducted at a graduation ceremony in circumstances where, as we
have found, young graduates who object are induced to conform."'
So, coercion becomes an issue only because of the presence of a
"religious exercise." In this case, the prayers were held to constitute a
religious exercise. Obviously, then, the foundational question was
whether the prayers did in fact constitute a religious exercise.
The significance of the presence of religious exercises is that the
Supreme Court is much more sensitive to coercion in the religious
context than in the free speech/conscience context. Of course the
government may not coerce belief in either context. But the meaning
of coercion differs. For example, if The Star Spangled Banner was
sung at the graduation in Lee and if the audience rose for the
rendition, all the same elements of coercion would have been present
as for the prayers. But the claim that such a practice violates the free
speech rights of students would have been rejected out of hand. The
protesting student or parent would have been told to simply refuse to
sing and refuse to stand. The only reason a different response was
28. Id. at 595.
29. Id. at 599.
30. Id.
56 [Vol. 38:1
given in Lee is that the government was engaging in a religious
exercise. In fact, it is likely that the prayers at the graduation would
have been banned even if they had not been prayed aloud but only
projected onto the walls so that there would have been no coercion to
participate in their rendition.
Thus, we return to the question, what made what the rabbi had
to say a "religious exercise?" We have seen that the obvious
answer-the references to God-was not the reason Justice Kennedy
presented. Nor did the existence of coercion affect this
characterization.
Another possible approach to defining the invocation and
benediction as religious exercises would have been for Justice
Kennedy to agree with Judge Bownes that "[a]n invocation (literally
invoking the name of God over the proceedings) and a benediction
(blessing the proceedings) are by their very terms prayers and
religious."" Anything that is called a prayer is necessarily religious.
The problem with this approach was that Judge Bownes was
trying to show that the use of the word "God" is not what defines a
forbidden religious exercise. He was attempting to come up with a
definition of prayer that does not require a reference to God. What
Judge Bownes actually believed, however, was that "it is probably
impossible to pray without invoking a deity directly or indirectly.",2
And he quoted the Fifth Circuit to like effect: "'[P]rayer is... an
address of entreaty, supplication, praise or thanksgiving directed
toward some sacred or divine spirit, being or object."'33
Thus, this approach-prayer is what refers to God-would have
been no help to Justice Kennedy, who we should remember was also
trying to define a religious exercise without any reference to God,
direct or indirect. The question then remains, what defines a religious
exercise?
This is the role of objective morality in the Lee opinion-it
serves to define a religious exercise. The "conviction that there is an
ethic and a morality which transcend human invention" is a religious
assertion. And what renders such an assertion a prayer is implied by
Justice Kennedy's use of the word "aspire," as in "prayers which
aspire to these ends." Justice Kennedy is implying that prayer is
31. Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090, 1097 (1st Cir. 1990) (Bownes, J., concurring).
32. Id. (Bownes, J., concurring).
33. Id. (quoting Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897, 901 (5th Cir. 1981), affd, 455 U.S.
913 (1982)).
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aspirational language that invokes objective morality, whether or not
God is invoked.
This understanding of religious exercise also explains why Justice
Kennedy responded at the end of his opinion to the objection that the
holding in the case prohibits a "place in the student's life for precepts
of [higher] morality."" Justice Kennedy really did intend to prohibit
the government from teaching objective morality, because he felt that
any such effort would inevitably be religious in nature. And he knew
that the prohibition against teaching objective morality would bring
forth this objection. After Lee, there would be no way for
government officials to bring precepts of higher morality,
normatively, into the public school curriculum except, perhaps as
accommodations to the private speech of students. But, of course,
private speech is not part of the curriculum of the public school. A
school could teach comparative morality-could teach that nothing is
absolutely true, but people have believed all these different things-
but that is by definition not teaching objective morality.
The final introductory question is why Rabbi Gutterman's
prayers" were thought by Justice Kennedy to invoke objective
morality in the first place. The prayers thanked God for our liberty
and democracy. They sought God's blessing and thanked him for
reaching the happy occasion of the graduation, in language
reminiscent of the Jewish Shehecheyanu prayer.36 All of that might
certainly be considered religious and certainly could be thought to be
prohibited by the Establishment Clause. But there is not much to
suggest anything about morality per se.
Only in one place in the prayers does a universal ethic and
morality appear: "'The graduates now need strength and guidance for
the future, help them to understand that we are not complete with
academic knowledge alone. We must each strive to fulfill what You
require of us all: To do justly, to love mercy, to walk humbly.""'
These statements clearly call for objective morality. The rabbi is
claiming that justice, mercy and humility are norms for how we are to
live. Even if we could agree on a conventional content for these
terms, the question of objective morality would be, what renders
34. Lee, 505 U.S. at 598.
35. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
36. "Blessed are you, Lord, our God, sovereign of the universe, who has kept us alive,
sustained us, and enabled us to reach this season."
37. Lee, 505 U.S. at 582 (quoting Rabbi Leslie Gutterman's Invocation and
Benediction).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 38:158
these values binding? Why is it better to be just, merciful and humble
rather than unjust, cruel and arrogant? Our religions all assert that
the former values transcend human invention. These values are
presented by our religions as objectively binding on all human beings.
But, as far as Justice Kennedy is concerned, for those of us without
any religious foundation, that commitment is just their opinion, the
"shared conviction" of these different faiths.
We are left with a rather bleak skepticism. According to Justice
Kennedy, moral assertions transcending human invention are
inherently religious, and aspiration toward that end, inevitably
prayer. Thus government is prohibited by the Establishment Clause
from voicing or aspiring to such moral ends. No moral common
ground is possible without a religious foundation. I doubt Justice
Kennedy really believes all this, for it would have profound and
troubling implications for what public schools would be permitted to
teach. Nevertheless, this is what the Lee opinion seems to suggest.
What is the basis of this moral skepticism?
H. The Death of God and the End of Objective Morality
My fellow atheists-to put my own cards on the table-often
face the criticism in America that "they cannot be good people
without belief in God."" Strictly speaking, this criticism is not related
to the question of objective morality. Even if morality is nothing
more than human invention, atheists could of course choose to act in
ways that are regarded as traditionally and conventionally "good."
Indeed, it is obviously inaccurate to assert that atheists lie, cheat and
steal to a greater extent than do religious believers.
The issue of objective morality is different from the question of
behavior. Objective morality has to do with goodness itself. Since
the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche announced the death of God,"
the question for the West has been the existence of an objective and
universal moral law. In the words of Gianni Vattimo, "for Nietzsche,
'God is dead' means nothing else than the fact that there is no
38. See, e.g., Lauri Lebo, "The Social Cost of Atheism," Religion Dispatches, June 10,
2010, http://www.religiondispatches.org/dispatches/laurilebo/2783/the social costof atheism
("[Survey] [r]espondents "were also asked to provide an example of a social situation
where they experienced stigma for being an atheist. A typical answer was being told that
they can not [sic] be good people without belief in God. I've always found this idea
absurd, as if people can't love and care for others and make ethical decisions without an
instruction manual.").
39. See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE § 108, at 167, § 125, at 181
(Walter Kaufmann trans., 1974) (1877).
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ultimate foundation."4 Consciously or unconsciously, Justice
Kennedy was drawing from Nietzsche's heritage in consigning
objective morality to the sphere of religion and then prohibiting the
institutions of the secular state from invoking such morality.
The death of God never meant of course that organized religion
had disappeared. Thus, recent claims that "God is back" in terms of
the numbers and influence of religious believers in the world have
nothing to do with the question of objective morality.41 I doubt
Nietzsche would have been surprised by the resurgence of the
religious right, for example. He would have considered that
phenomenon a shadow of God.42
With exceptions, 43 American law seems to have taken Nietzsche
to heart and to have abandoned the idea of morality that transcends
human invention. Richard Posner put it succinctly: "The natural law
project has never recovered from what Nietzsche called the death of
God (at the hands of Darwin).""
A spectacular, because candid and dramatic, example of the
Nietzsche effect was written in 1979 by Yale Law Professor Arthur
Leff.45 Leff directly linked Nietzsche to the impossibility of morality
beyond human invention: "The so-called death of God turns out not
to have been just His funeral; it also seems to have effected the total
elimination of any coherent, or even more than momentarily
convincing, ethical or legal system dependent upon finally
authoritative extrasystemic premises."" To drive home just what that
implied, just what the implications of morality founded only upon
human invention are, Leff ended his piece with a despairing
observation and poem:
40. GIANNI VATTIMO, AFTER CHRISTIANITY 3 (Luca D'Isanto trans., 2002).
41. See JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, GOD IS BACK: How THE
GLOBAL REVIVAL OF FAITH IS CHANGING THE WORLD 27 (2009).
42. NIETZSCHE, supra note 39 ("God is Dead; but given the way of men, there may
still be caves for thousands of years in which his shadow will be shown. And we-we still
have to vanquish his shadow, too.").
43. One important exception was Charles Black. He criticized "the widespread
modern view that only delusion beckons when we conceive of 'justice' as having anything
remotely like the objective reality which invests the positive institutions of law. We have
no warrant, say the followers of this view, for supposing that there exists any 'justice'
which can be 'discovered'; 'justice' is merely a name for our own reactions." CHARLES L.
BLACK, JR., THE HUMANE IMAGINATION 37 (1986).
44. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 14 (1990).
45. Arthur Allen Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229
(1979).
46. Id. at 1232.
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All I can say is this: it looks as if we are all we have. Given
what we know about ourselves and each other, this is an
extraordinarily unappetizing prospect; looking around the
world, it appears that if all men are brothers, the ruling model
is Cain and Abel ....
As things now stand, everything is up for grabs.
Nevertheless:
Napalming babies is bad.
Starving the poor is wicked.
Buying and selling each other is depraved.
Those who stood up to and died resisting Hitler, Stalin, Amin,
and
Pol Pot-and General Custer too-have earned salvation.
Those who acquiesced deserve to be damned.
There is in the world such a thing as evil.
[All together now:] Sez who?
47God help us.
As Steven Smith has argued in terms of lawyers and legal
practice, 48 despite the death of God, humankind continues to act as if
universal and objective norms exist. In 1998, the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda issued the world's first conviction for
genocide and crimes against humanity against Jean-Paul Akayesu, the
mayor of the Rwandan town of Taba. 49 Recently, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia convicted Vujadin
Popovic and Ljubisa Beara, two security officers for the Bosnian Serb
Army, of genocide for their actions in 1995.o It is a little hard to
believe that Justice Kennedy would consider the prohibition against
genocide a mere human invention or prohibit public schools from
teaching that genocide is objectively wrong. But Leff would say in
response that we have not yet realized that everything is up for grabs.
Poor Leff. He never did understand that without God, the
problem is not that everything is up for grabs, but that nothing is.
47. Id. at 1249.
48. Steven D. Smith, Higher Law Questions: A Prelude to the Symposium, 36 PEPP. L.
REV. 463 (2009).
49. See U.S. Holocaust Mem'l Museum, Rwanda: The First Conviction for Genocide,
in HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/enlarticle.php?Moduleld=10007157
(last visited June 12,2010).
50. Marlise Simons, Genocide Verdicts in Srebrenica Killings, N.Y. TIMES, June 10,
2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/11/world/europe/11hague.html.
Fall 2010] 61
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Without God, by which I mean without the promise of something
creative and trustworthy at the heart of reality, humanity is left in the
iron cage of whatever-is-at-the-moment. That is why Leff could not
offer anything genuinely transformative and was left with his despair,
whereas Bob Cover, his God-intoxicated colleague, could."
The concept of objective morality plays a role in the culture wars
in American public life somewhat similar to the role it played in
Lee-it is used as a marker in the struggle between religion and
nonbelief. Claims about objective morality are used as a weapon and
which way the weapon cuts depends entirely on the political context.
So, for example, Rick Warren challenges Sam Harris in a Newsweek
debate in 2007 as follows: "If life is just random chance, then nothing
really does matter and there is no morality-it's survival of the fittest.
If survival of the fittest means me killing you to survive, so be it. For
years, atheists have said there is no God, but they want to live like
God exists. They want to live like their lives have meaning.""
In this context, Warren is challenging the public acceptability of
atheism on the ground that atheism is inherently nihilistic. Harris
responds, perhaps disingenuously, "I'm not at all a moral relativist. I
think it's quite common among religious people to believe that
atheism entails moral relativism. I think there is an absolute right and
wrong. I think honor killing, for example, is unambiguously wrong-
you can use the word evil."" But presumably Nietzsche would here
agree with Warren (although he might have said that Warren is
fooling himself in thinking that just because a person asserts that he is
bound by God, and thinks that he is bound by God, he really is bound
by God).
On the other hand, Steven Gey, in arguing that religious
motivations for public policy are inherently undemocratic, contrasts
the "comprehensive unity of purpose that affirms an identifiable set
of fundamental values" that religion seeks with the "the principles of
skepticism and constant ideological evolution, the recognition of
which prevents the government from ever enshrining in law any
51. Compare Leff, supra note 45, with Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
52. The God Debate, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 9, 2007, available at,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/ id/17889148/site/newsweek/print/1/displaymode/1098/.
53. Id. Perhaps Harris was not being disingenuous. See his new book, THE MORAL
LANDSCAPE (2010), in which Harris argues against moral relativism on the basis of
science.
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particular set of fundamental values to the exclusion of any other set
of values" that form the core of constitutional democracy.54
Here, Gey is celebrating the end of objective morality on the
grounds of pluralism and is attacking religion's commitment to
objective morality as undemocratic. In this example, Nietzschean
post-modernism is said to lead not to nihilism, but to human freedom.
Gey clearly agrees with Justice Kennedy that the common ground of
objective morality is a religious concept that cannot be promoted by
government because of the Establishment Clause.
In his magnum opus, A Secular Age, Charles Taylor also wrestles
with objective morality in our time. He raises the question whether
the endorsement of "universal human rights," which he identifies
rightly as one of the great achievements of modernity, can be
understood without the kind of "intrinsically higher demand" that
does not "fit our favoured ontology" of naturalism?" Taylor asks
what "causes or lies behind" or justifies the sense of "moral assent"-
"the phenomenology of universalism, the sense of breaking out of an
earlier space and acceding to a higher one, the sense of liberation,
even exaltation which accompanies this move"-that we experience
as we struggle against prejudice and discrimination? We know that
our commitment to increased human solidarity is right, but how can
this be so when our best phenomenology does not fit our ontology?
Taylor coyly states at this point that he has "hunches" but that they
are "theistic."5 6 Undoubtedly, the reader is meant to conclude that
human moral development demonstrates a morality that transcends
human invention.
I have objected elsewhere that Taylor "seems to be suggesting
that ultimate value requires the existence of God."" This amounts to
pretending that the secular age could in effect be reversed. Indeed in
his final chapter, which is called "Conversions," Taylor describes a
number of "conversions (or reconversions) to Christianity."" I doubt
54. Steven G. Gey, Unity of the Graveyard and the Attack on Constitutional
Secularism, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1005, 1021-22 (2004).
55. CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 608-09 (2007). Taylor associates modem
ontology with David Hume rather than Nietzsche, but since he attributes exclusive
humanism to both. Id. at 247. However, this difference does not alter the point.
56. Id. at 609.
57. Bruce Ledewitz, Charles Taylor and the Future of Secularism, 3.1 EXPOSITIONS
105, 110 (2009).
58. TAYLOR, supra note 55, at 744.
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that the secular age can be reversed. Nor do I think such a reversal is
necessary to recover objective morality.
Many secularists fear what Taylor seems to hope for-a recovery
of traditional supernatural religion. Secularists who support a
decision like Lee act as if it is very important that the Supreme Court
prevent the public schools from teaching students about a man in the
sky who does tricks and they want the Supreme Court to keep biology
classes from showing pictures of cavemen alongside dinosaurs. The
truth is that the theistic worldview that supports that kind of religion
is fading, especially among the young. Even if such things were
taught, they would not take.
More important than keeping that kind of religion out of the
public schools, is the question what will the public schools be
permitted to teach young people in the future? The answer to that
question cannot just be to prevent "the "precepts of [higher]
morality" from being taught, as Justice Kennedy put it." If objective
morality is not taught in the schools, then the implicit morality of our
day will take over. That implicit morality is capitalism and
nationalism. Ironically, the students whom secularists want to teach
that morality is a human invention are going to assume that the
market and the nation-state are natural phenomena. Those structures
will become for them normative and natural.
Although some people consider atheism to be a radical
perspective, aside from its challenge to established religion, it has not
been radical at all when it comes to its relationship to power. The
New Atheists, such as Christopher Hitchens, Daniel Dennett, and
Richard Dawkins, are not known for their commitment to social
justice. I am afraid that all an Establishment Clause, as enforced in
Lee, will achieve is the entrenchment of materialist consumption
backed by military force.
What is needed instead is a new age of human discovery,
especially in our schools. We must foster a recommitment to serious
thinking about the nature of reality and the nature of the human
experience. Such an effort would not avoid but would explore moral
life. I believe that in such exploration, grounds of objective morality
would be discovered. I of course cannot put forth a fully formed
common ground for objective morality, either here or anywhere else.
But I think we can identify some of the sources from which such
common ground might eventually emerge.
59. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598 (1992).
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III. Shards of Common Ground
The position I am attempting to contest is what I think of as the
LefflJustice Kennedy position. "Everything is up for grabs" is treated
by them as the secular position. Any nonrelativist approach to
morality is considered by them to be religious. I am trying to show
that the project of attempting to identify objective morality is not
necessarily religious.
"Everything" for Leff refers primarily to morality and the
ground of morality. Morality for Leff means something like whether
there are convincing reasons why we should live one way rather than
another. Leff's "up for grabs" means what Justice Kennedy refers to
as a matter of human invention. So, living one way rather than
another is nothing more than a matter of human invention, of human
choice. The suggestion in both formulations is that human invention
is arbitrary and willful, in the sense that something chosen could
equally have been chosen otherwise.
This last point, however, is unconvincing. The steam engine is a
human invention, but it could not easily be other than it is. There are
many constraints on how a steam engine can work. So even if our
morality were a human invention, that would not necessarily preclude
its objective grounding.
In the same sense, a baseball game may be said to be "up for
grabs" before it is played. But the better team is still likely to win.
It may be that there are no absolute barriers to innovation in
human ways of life and that therefore everything may be thought of
as theoretically up for grabs. Nevertheless, human cultures have
always been quite similar in many ways. And today, with a growing
system of "globalized democratic capitalism," with all those terms in
quotation marks but still a recognizable system, the notion that
human beings face an unlimited number of actual choices about how
to live, seems exaggerated.
So, even if the reader ultimately concludes that everything is up
for grabs and everything is a matter of human invention, it does not
necessarily follow that our ways of life are arbitrary and that it is only
religion that restricts our choices.
In any event, I believe that there is common ground for human
life and that not everything is even potentially up for grabs as a
matter of human invention. Let me now introduce what common
ground might mean: Are there starting points for all human beings in
encountering reality, including the reality of themselves, from which
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to try to construct a way of life that is faithful to that reality? I think
there are.
My modest attempt at a beginning for such common ground is a
long way from what Leff states we cannot have as human beings: "a
complete, transcendent, and immanent set of propositions about right
and wrong, findable rules that authoritatively and unambiguously
direct us how to live righteously."" Surely what Leff is describing was
not available even before the death of God. Christians regularly
killed each other, after all, over just such disagreements. And the
rabbis plainly favored some aspects of the Old Testament over others,
placing restrictions on divinely sanctioned capital punishment, for
example.6 1
What God represented was not the one obvious and particular
authoritative answer to the question of human life, but rather
authoritativeness itself. We might not be able to agree about the
content of God's will, but believers could agree that His will is
binding. His will was not itself a matter of human invention.
Therefore, interpretation of that will, while inevitably human
judgment and thus "not in heaven" (as the Talmud put it),62 could be
conceived of, and argued about, as either faithful or unfaithful. An
interpretation of divine will could be right or wrong, whereas if our
ways of life are purely a matter of human invention, they cannot be
thought of as wrong or right. The divine rules were never findable in
the sense that Leff implies. They played a different role.
Furthermore, even before the death of God, there was the issue
of the absence of God, which was always a concern in Christian
civilization.63 We tend to treat those who say they believe in God as if
they have easy access to the divine, while nonbelievers have none.
But, as the example of Mother Teresa shows us," the genuine believer
may feel so distant from God as to experience despair. Things are not
as simple for believers as Justice Kennedy and Leff suggest. Believers
60. LEFF, supra note 45, at 1229.
61. See Bruce S. Ledewitz and Scott Staples, Reflections on the Talmudic and
American Death Penalty, 6 UNIv. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 33, 38-41 (1993).
62. This is Rabbi Joshua's famous response to a heavenly voice opining concerning a
legal ruling in the story of the Oven of Aknai, found in the Babylonian Talmud Baba
Mezia 59a. For commentary on the story, see Bruce Ledewitz, The Openness of Talmud,
41 DuQ. L. REv. 353, 356-59 (2003).
63. See, e.g., RICHARD ELLIOTr FRIEDMAN, THE DISAPPEARANCE OF GOD (1995).
64. See David Van Biema, Mother Teresa's Crisis of Faith, TIME, Aug. 23, 2007,
available at http://www.time.com/time/worldlarticle/0,8599,1655415,00.html.
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never had a reliable rulebook and they did not always even have
access to the umpire.
So, in not presenting a complete system of the sort Leff calls
impossible, I am not sure that the indeterminate situation of the
nonbeliever today differs entirely from that of the believer
historically. In any event, it is the case that I can only present shards,
pieces, of the common ground that I believe humans share, whether
they are religious believers or not.
Leff says that right and wrong are not demonstrable. The source
of that impossibility is the death of God, but not in the superficial
sense of the non-existence of God. Vattimo captures the genuine
radicalism of Nietzsche as follows: "Nietzsche could not state a thesis
like the nonexistence of God because the claim to its absolute truth
would have to be upheld as a metaphysical principle, that is, as the
true 'structure' of reality, having the same function as the traditional
God of metaphysics."" According to this reading of Nietzsche, we
cannot affirm absolute right and wrong because we cannot affirm one
true structure of reality.
Already we see that the existing context is not as Leff and Justice
Kennedy assume. For them, the secular state should undoubtedly be
agnostic about whether God exists. But they would assert that God
either exists or He does not. And this is also what most secularists
who support separation of church and state would say. The New
Atheists, for example, often try to demonstrate that God does not
exist in good, traditional, classically metaphysical fashion.6
That attempt to prove the nonexistence of God just shows that
seeking to understand the true structure of reality is not a solely
"religious" position. Many people who believe that God does not
exist, and to that extent are not religious, also reject the Nietzschean
challenge to traditional metaphysics. But if, instead, we can
understand the true structure of reality, as many people assume we
can, then we can try to build a moral order that seeks to be faithful to
that reality. Such a moral order would not be a merely human
invention. And that would be true whether God exists or not.
This is the way-through seeking to understand the true
structure of reality-that C.S. Lewis sought to identify objective
morality, which he called "objective value."6 Objective value, he
65. VATrIMO, supra note 40, at 3.
66. See, e.g., RICHARD DAWKINS, THE GOD DELUSION (2006).
67. C. S. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN 12 (1950).
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wrote, is "the belief that certain attitudes are really true, and others
really false, to the kind of thing the universe is and the kind of things
we are."" Lewis did not restrict this understanding of objective
morality to the religious traditions. He referred to this attitude as
"the Tao" and he perceived it as present in classic philosophy as well
as religion. Lewis contrasted this attitude with the modern temper of
relativism in which genuine justice, or even injustice, is impossible in
principle.
Lewis came back to objective standards, admittedly in a more
religious manner, in Mere Christianity." He began there by noting
that when people make claims against each other they usually show
that they have an innate sense of right and wrong concerning matters
like taking your turn and keeping your promises. In such arguments,
people generally appeal to common standards of fairness. Rarely, he
notes, does the person challenged respond, "To hell with your
standard." Instead, the other person will attempt to explain just why
the general standard of fairness does not apply in this particular case.
Lewis concludes, "It looks. . . very much as if both parties had in
mind some kind of Law or Rule of fair play or decent behavior or
morality. .. about which they really agreed." 0 This standard used to
be called the Law of Nature and Lewis also calls it the Moral Law.
By no means does this Moral Law correspond to what people
actually do. It corresponds to what people ought to do and usually to
what they know they ought to do. And human beings "all over the
earth" invoke the same basic standard of fairness." Lewis responds
specifically to the claim that this is a matter of human invention: This
standard of right and wrong "must somehow or other be a real
thing-a thing that is really there, not made up by ourselves."72
Lewis found this objective value by looking at the actions and
statements of people, both children and adults. He did not think you
could learn as much by looking at the laws of nature as such: "things
like gravitation, or heredity, or the laws of chemistry."" But there is
an emerging science today that is both much more systematic than
Lewis could be and looks at human beings at a much earlier age than
Lewis was addressing. This new research about "The Moral Life of
68. Id.
69. C. S. LEWIS, MERE CHRISTIANITY (1958).
70. Id. at 3.
71. Id. at 7.
72. Id. at 16.
73. Id. at 4.
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Babies" was summarized in a New York Times Magazine article in
May 2010.74 Through close observation of attention that babies give
to moral scenarios, scientists have produced a "growing body of
evidence suggest[ing] that humans do have a rudimentary moral sense
from the very start of life.... [Y]ou can see glimmers of moral
thought, moral judgment and moral feeling even in the first year of
life. Some sense of good and evil seems to be bred in the bone."" Of
course, this is precisely what Lewis would have predicted.
Lewis also looked only at human beings. But more support for
his view is now coming from evolutionary studies of animals. Judge
Posner noted the decline in natural law thinking is due to
Darwinbecause of the then-prevailing view that the Nature from
which we descended was "red in tooth and claw.", 6  Today,
researchers such as Frans B. M. de Waal are showing that moral
tendencies in human beings evolved and that our closest relatives also
exhibit traits such as empathy and cooperation." Nature is not so
"red." Again, though Lewis in no way anticipated these discoveries,
he would have welcomed them as evidence that the universe really is
a certain kind of moral thing and that we are also.
We should think of the Lewis position as comprising two claims.
First, the structure of reality can be known. Second, the structure of
reality tends to endorse the good. For Lewis, the "ought" can be
derived from an "is" because the existence of moral intuition is a fact
to be known like any other fact.
I admit that Lewis believed that the existence of God was
implied by these two positions. Leff and Justice Kennedy may agree
with Lewis about that, which is perhaps why objective morality is
thought by them to be religious. But others, myself included, accept
the first premise, and even the second, without believing that
something like God must exist.
In any event, it is plain that many secularists accept Lewis' first
conclusion. That position-reality can be known-by itself is
certainly not religious. In the book Quantum, Manjit Kumar
describes the fundamental debate in Physics over whether the role of
74. Paul Bloom, "The Moral Life of Babies," N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2010, at MM44.
75. Id. at MM46.
76. POSNER, supra note 44, at 14: "It was one thing to speak of 'natural law' when
nature was conceived to be the expression of divine love or order, and quite another to
find universal legal norms in Darwinian nature, red in tooth and claw."
77. See FRANS B. M. DE WAAL, PRIMATES AND PHILOSOPHERS: How MORALITY
EVOLVED (Stephen Macedo, et al. eds., 2006).
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physics is to describe a reality that objectively exists, or whether
instead, the role of physics is to clarify what we can say about reality.
For Albert Einstein, God does not play dice and thus there is law and
order and an objectively existing reality. For Niels Bohr, on the other
hand, unlike objects in the everyday world, there is no quantum
reality that exists independently of the observer."
While it is true that Einstein tended to use God-language in
reference to the objective world he was trying to describe, he did not
mean the ontologically distinct God of the Bible. And even though
Bohr in a sense challenged our ability to know the true structure of
reality, he should not be thought of as endorsing Nietzsche. Both
scientists were seeking to know the structure of reality as well as it
could be known. Neither of these two positions should be considered
religious as such.
This observation is significant because even if Lewis' second
conclusion-that reality tends to endorse the good-is thought of as
religious, the first one is not religious in any sense. If one accepts that
the true structure of the universe can be known, then objective
morality is possible. Any values that comport with the true structure
of reality would be objectively grounded. This alone undermines the
Leff/Justice Kennedy position that objective morality is inherently
religious.
But I would go further and assert that even Lewis' second
conclusion is not religious as such. While Lewis assumed that the
good could not be the foundation of reality unless God exists, he may
have been mistaken. Just as higher levels of matter would not be
possible if atoms could not bond, it may be that higher levels of life
would not be possible without empathy and cooperation. In other
words, we humans may tend to the good because otherwise we could
not exist. If that is the case, then reality would tend to the good, but
that conclusion would still not be religious.
The rudimentary morality that Lewis refers to is not the only
evidence for objective morality. History is a second, and perhaps
more convincing, shard of common ground. For it is through history
that humanity achieves moral consensus on the matters of right and
wrong that Leff considers indemonstrable.
Slavery, which was practiced throughout human history, is the
best example both of indemonstrability and historical consensus.
Obviously, slavery was endorsed by the Bible and was thought by
78. MANJIT KUMAR, QUANTUM 262, 331 (2009).
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many to be genuinely defensible." On the eve of the Civil War, the
South defended slavery on its moral merits. This kind of dispute
supports Leff's conclusion that right and wrong can be endlessly
debated.
But we now know that the South was wrong. I mean that
statement literally. We "know" that the defenders of slavery were
"wrong," objectively wrong. The unfolding human consensus against
slavery demonstrates that moral objectivity. There are no longer
public defenders of slavery, and there never will be again, unless
some catastrophe causes the lessons of history to be forgotten by
future humanity. How can one say that everything is up for grabs or
that morality is a human invention, when this kind of human
consensus is clear?
There are a few other examples of such historical clarity. The
Nazi genocide of the Jews and others is one such example. The fact
that one can imagine an unrepentant Nazi is irrelevant. There are all
kinds of criminals in the world. The private thoughts of criminals and
even their actions do not provide a public challenge to humanity's
objective moral consensus. Some things in history become
unthinkable to humanity as a whole.
It also does not undermine this position to point out that
genocide continues to happen despite the Nazi example. The
perpetrators of such actions do not argue that the Nazi genocide was
justified, but argue that their situation is different.
I am not here appealing to overall moral progress. We invent
new inhumanities all the time. And there are very few instances in
which history teaches a lesson as clearly as in the case of slavery.
But the relative paucity of examples in which history teaches
objective morality is not that important in terms of refuting the
Leff/Justice Kennedy position. For that position requires that
everything be up for grabs, that no moral statement be objective. The
reason for such an extreme requirement is that if anything could be
shown to be objectively right or wrong, then we could reason from
that example and eventually, at least in theory, could reach a more
detailed, objectively moral position.
There are several candidates for such moral consensus in the
future: the equality of women, the rights of the handicapped, the end
of capital punishment, the acceptance of homosexuality. I believe the
day will come when all of these will be as accepted as the prohibition
79. See Leviticus 25:44-46.
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of slavery is today. That day is not yet, of course, and so these
positions are as yet indemonstrable. But such moral judgments are
subject to history. They are not ultimately matters of human
invention.
Morality that transcends human invention is clearest in a form of
historical moral judgment in which super-human forces are at work. I
have in mind here global warming and the related environmental
threats to human welfare. Increasingly, it is difficult to think of the
natural world as something for humanity to exploit without limit, as in
some sense belonging to humans. Eventually a new environmental
ethic will be born and will become humanity's inheritance. This new
consensus will not be chosen but will be forced on us. It will not be a
matter of human invention. History can be, and often is, sovereign.
Religion, particularly Biblical religion, often takes the form of
historical sovereignty in which God is seen to act in history. Most
famously, God sets before the Israelites a blessing and a curse, the
result of human choice to be visible in terms whether the people
prosper in the land or not.*
But the fact that God is seen as acting in history does not render
attention to history religious. It may be the case that wrongful action
reliably leads to national catastrophe. If that is so, it is strong support
for objective morality; but recognition of that fact is still not a
religious conclusion.
Another shard of common ground is reason. I hesitate to
mention reason because the evidence is piling up, if evidence were
even needed, that in any account of human behavior, reason plays
only a small role." I mention it because reason is so often contrasted
with faith that if reason could be shown to support the common
ground that could lead to the recognition of objective morality, no
one would think of calling that religious.
The obvious place to start in looking at the potential of reason,
especially in the American context, is the Declaration of
Independence. The Declaration of Independence calls certain truths
about humanity "self-evident" and obviously insofar as that is so,
objective morality would follow. While there has been much debate
about the role of the divine-"their Creator"-in the Declaration of
Independence,' the very first truth listed in it is not associated with
80. Deuteronomy 30: 1-20.
81. See, e.g., DAN ARIELY, THE UPSIDE OF IRRATIONALITY (2010).
82. See, e.g., H. Wayne House, Influence of the Natural Law Theology of the
Declaration of Independence on the Establishment of Personhood in the United States
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the rights with which men are endowed by their creator. The first
such self-evident truth is that "all men are created equal." This
statement does not imply a creator as much as it simply acknowledges
that humans come into existence. Some type of deserved equal
treatment is thought to follow from that truth and thus one has a
common ground for the beginning of objective morality.
Of course, the self-evidence of human equality has been
disputed-John C. Calhoun in 1848 called it "the most false and
dangerous of all political errors""-but the point I am making is that
in asserting this proposition, the framers of the Declaration of
Independence, most notably Thomas Jefferson, were engaging in
nonreligious argument about objective morality, here political
morality. They were not engaging in religious disputation.
Even the Declaration's propositions about unalienable rights
with which men are endowed by their creator are not strictly speaking
religious. They are said to be the result of self-evident insight. All
human beings, in other words, are held to recognize these truths
about rights if they are acting in good faith.
It is a common error to contrast the supposed religious quality of
the Declaration of Independence with the so-called godless
Constitution. One well-known example of this tendency is the book,
The Godless Constitution, in which Isaac Kramnick and R. Laurence
Moore argue that the Constitution differs from the Declaration of
Independence in that the Declaration mentions God, that is, the
creator, whereas the Constitution is godless and thus secular.4
This position mistakes the role of the creator language in the
Declaration of Independence. That language serves to ground rights
as transcending positive law. In other words, the reference to the
creator serves a higher law/natural law purpose. But it does not do
this by establishing or even proposing that a supernatural realm
exists. Endowed just means "having these rights without regard to
the actions and opinions of men." In other words our rights are not
human inventions.
Despite the absence of creator or God-language, the
Constitution shares precisely this commitment to natural rights. That
Constitution, 2 LIBERTY UNIV. L. REV. 725, 746 (2008) (reference to Creator in the
Declaration shows "a divine natural law position").
83. A. E. ELMORE, LINCOLN'S GETTYSBURG ADDRESS: ECHOES OF THE BIBLE AND
BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER 156 (2009).
84. ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION 28
(2d ed. 2005).
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is the point of the Ninth Amendment, which states that "[t]he
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.""'
Although there is controversy in American jurisprudence about
whether the Ninth Amendment should be judicially enforceable,
there is no question that its purpose is to render explicit the
proposition that there are "unalienable rights" that exist
independently of positive law, in this case independently of their
enumeration in the Bill of Rights. The absence of a word like "God"
as the source of these rights does not render the Constitution atheistic
any more than the presence of such a word renders the Declaration
theistic. These are political documents and their political worldview
is the same. The addition of the word "God" or "Creator" to the
Ninth Amendment would have changed nothing. Its deletion from
the Declaration of Independence would have changed nothing either,
in the terms of the question we are looking at here: Does reason lead
to a common ground of objective morality?
Coincidently, as I was working on this section, I received a copy
of the Boston University Law Review issue containing the symposium
held in September 2009 to discuss Ronald Dworkin's new book,
Justice for Hedgehogs.86 As described by the editors, the point of
Dworkin's book is to defend the unity of value against skepticism and
forms of pluralism."
I cannot do justice to the book or to the symposium here. I
mention them not because Dworkin would agree with my common
ground arguments-he would argue on the contrary that the positions
of both C. S. Lewis and Arthur Leff are unintelligible because they
derive an ought from an is-but because the undertaking itself
reminds us that, in the words of Daniel Star in the symposium,
"[r]ational debates between moral realists and moral skeptics"-
which is the language in which disputes about objective morality are
discussed-"are essentially philosophical debates."a They are not
religious disagreements and should not be treated as such.
The final shard of common ground I will mention is our common
human situation. We find ourselves already in the world, as Martin
85. U.S. CONsT. amend. IX.
86. Symposium, Justice for Hedgehogs: A Conference on Ronald Dworkin's
Forthcoming Book, 90 B.U. L. REV. 465-1087 (2010).
87. Sarah J. Kitchell & Joshua M. D. Segal, Editors' Forward, 90 B.U. L. REV. 465
(2010).
88. Daniel Star, Moral Skepticism for Foxes, 90 B.U. L. REv. 497, 497 (2010).
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Heidegger might say, oriented toward the meaning of it all, oriented
toward being. Once, when we were studying Heidegger, I asked my
far more learned colleague, Robert Taylor, what Heidegger meant by
being, by Sein. He responded, "how significance comes on the
scene."
At first, I took this to refer to the sense of significance that we
attribute to our lives. Both for the skeptic Leff, as well as for the
realist Lewis, our understanding of our situation is important, indeed
crucial. As a character in E. L. Doctorow's 2000 novel, City of God,
says, we "live in moral consequence."8 9 The moral skeptic, the
fatalist, the nihilist and the materialist all agree with that. They all
share their insights with the rest of us so that we will not be fooled
into thinking things are different from the way they really are. And
from just this sense of the significance of life, even when life is a
disappointment, a kind of common ground is forged in which my
fellow human beings are my brothers and sisters sharing my situation.
But I came to see that there was even more to significance.
There is an elusive quality in human life, another layer if you will
below the surface. Poetry, to which Heidegger often returns, is one
form in which this elusive quality is shown, or hinted at. I recently
read a review of the poet Anne Carson's new book, Nox, about the
death of her brother.' In the book, she reproduces Catullus's poem
No. 101: an elegy delivered at the burial site of his brother:
Many the peoples many the oceans I crossed -
I arrive at these poor, brother, burials
so I could give you the last gift qwed to death
and talk (why?) with mute ash.
Carson then writes this about the poem: "'No one (even in Latin)
can approximate Catullan diction, which at its most sorrowful has an
air of deep festivity, like one of those trees that turns all its leaves
over, silver, in the wind.'""
"[D]eep festivity"? At a funeral? But that is exactly right. A
funeral is a rite. This has nothing to do with belief in God, or with
religion in any narrow sense. It has to do with the mysterious, poetic
quality of human existence itself, a quality we usually ignore-we live
89. E.L. DocrOROW, CITY OF GOD 256 (2000).
90. Ben Ratliff, Lamentation, N.Y. TIMES, June 13,2010, at BR 13.
91. Id.
92. Id.
Fall 2010] 75
in prose-but which startles us with its vividness at the most
unexpected times. This experience of human life is our most intimate
common ground. Can we proceed from this common ground to
objective morality? Not if we mean by that term, rules to live by. But
if we mean by objective morality ways of life that honor the mystery
of human life, then I think that we can.
Generally when law attempts to do this, to come into the
neighborhood of being, the result is embarrassing. Probably the best
known example occurred in the opinions in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey,' in which the plurality wrote that "[a]t the heart of liberty is
the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life"" and Justice Scalia
sneered at the idea. He called it "exalted" in Casey' and in Lawrence
v. Texas, called it the "famed sweet-mystery-of-life passage."" These
were dismissive references.
To be fair, maybe the exchange in Casey was an exception.
Neither side in that case exhibited much sensitivity. The plurality was
obfuscating to avoid talking about the death of the unborn and
Justice Scalia would not know the poetry of human life if he ran over
it in a pickup truck. But I don't think Casey was exceptional. I think
rather that it is the nature of law and lawyers, in America at least, that
we do not attend to being.
But whether law does so or not, human beings still share this and
other shards of common ground. And to that extent, we may say that
Justice Kennedy was mistaken in Lee to think that prayer invoking
morality transcending human invention is inherently religious and
thus barred by the Establishment Clause at a public school. In the
next section I will attempt to specify an appropriate relationship
among the public schools, the common ground and the Establishment
Clause.
IV. Seeking Connon Ground in Public School
If Justice Kennedy is wrong about the religious quality of the
quest for objective morality, then Lee becomes a simple case. The
constitutional issue would then rest only on the references to God in
93. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
94. Id. at 851 (opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter, JJ.).
95. Id. at 980 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
96. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 588 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the graduation prayers. It would follow then that if the references to
God were eliminated, not by manipulation so that the references
remained, albeit indirect, but genuinely, the resulting prayers would
be constitutional. I will take up at the end of this paper the question
whether religious imagery itself, such as the use of the word "God,"
should always be prohibited in such circumstances. But certainly
without such religious usage, there would be no constitutional
violation.
If we took the common ground of objective morality seriously,
we could imagine Rabbi Gutterman speaking the following, perfectly
constitutional, Benediction:
We come together here tonight from many faiths and from no
faiths. We pray to different Gods and to no God. And we all
seek the knowledge of the right way to live. I will tell you what
my faith teaches me: all that is required of us is to do justice, to
love mercy and to walk in humility. That is my prayer for you.
Although the rabbi would be speaking out of one religious
tradition, the prayer would not be solely religious. It would be
secular as well, part of the search for the right way to live.
But what about the moral skeptic? Wouldn't a Leff leap to his
feet and insist that he at least did not seek the right way to live,
because there is no such thing. But the constitutional answer to this
objection is that if the prayer is not an establishment of religion, then
the critic has no constitutional ground to prevent its proclamation by
the government. Free speech ensures that Leff will not be forced to
affirm this claim about a right way to live, not that he may prevent it
from being spoken.
But graduation prayers are obviously not that significant in the
overall curriculum of American public schools. If we took the
common ground of morality seriously, school boards would do far
more in the direction of objective morality than arrange for
graduation prayers. They would organize the public school
curriculum around the best way to live. What else is education if it is
not education in how to live well? There would at least be one course
in high school devoted to this topic, which would sample all of
humanity's great traditions of wisdom, including of course the
religious ones.'
97. Stephen Prothero has made a suggestion that appears to be similar. See STEPHEN
PROTHERO, RELIGIOUS LITERACY 155-84 (2007). But Prothero is suggesting the need
Fall 20101 SEEKING 'COMMON GROUND' 77
This is the kind of education that America sorely needs in an age
of relativism, nihilism, materialism, and hopelessness. Education
today has become skills training to serve the machine of consumption.
Where, other than public school, will our young people, especially the
increasing number outside the religious traditions, learn to ask the
question of how to live?
This proposal would mark a change in the current educational
landscape. It would be the rare school board today that would be
brave enough to organize a curriculum in substantive moral
development. For one thing, officials would fear lawsuits pursuant to
the Establishment Clause under the influence of Lee. For another,
school boards would fear violating the teaching of West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette," which enjoined enforcement of a
State School Board regulation requiring children to salute the
American flag. Justice Robert Jackson memorably and properly,
under the circumstances of that case, wrote: "If there is any fixed star
in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty,
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion,
or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act
their faith therein.""
I certainly agree with Justice Jackson that no school student can
be constitutionally coerced to affirm any proposition. But the public
schools teach orthodoxies now, including the very ones, like love of
country, to which Justice Jackson was referring. I would simply add
another orthodoxy that the public schools could teach-that there are
right ways and wrong ways to live and that people can, especially with
the benefit of history and study, fruitfully attempt to determine what
those are. It is true that school boards might teach a substantive
morality that I would find harmful and false. But, if that morality is
not simply a front for religion, school boards could probably do that
now. Whatever the harm might be from such false teaching, it seems
to me that the dangers of nihilism on the one hand, and materialism
on the other, are far worse.
for knowledge about religion rather than learning moral wisdom from religion. Nor is my
suggestion aimed at advancing pluralist tolerance. While that is a good thing, the point of
this paper is that human beings, including students, actually must come to decision about
how to live and that not all choices are equally valid. Government cannot teach that the
religions are right but government can teach that something is right and also that a
number of options are wrong.
98. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 624 (1942).
99. Id. at 642.
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The curriculum I am proposing would require that school boards
self-consciously take control of teaching about morality in the public
schools. In the circumstances of a case like Lee, that would include
giving instructions to graduation speakers about what they might and
might not say when giving Invocations and Benedictions. It should be
remembered that the unconstitutionality in Lee had to do not with
any violation of the free speech rights of the rabbi, but that the
instructions led to prayers that the Supreme Court found violated the
Establishment Clause. The prayers amounted to government speech,
which violated the Establishment Clause. The role of the instructions
given to the speaker was simply to show clearly that the government
was responsible for the content of the speech. Under my proposal as
well, the school board would instruct the speaker as to content to
avoid violating the Establishment Clause. Of course my assumption
is that the interpretation of the Establishment Clause proposed here
would be accepted by the Supreme Court.
Under no circumstances should a graduation speaker like the
rabbi be thought of as engaging in anything other than some kind of
government speech. Such prayer certainly could not be
conceptualized as private speech. School boards should not be
allowed to hand off responsibility for the content of such prayers to
outside speakers. Therefore school boards must be held responsible
for the content of speech at an official event such as a graduation
ceremony. To that extent at least the Supreme Court was right in
Lee.
There has been some odd thinking about so-called private speech
in public schools. The State of Florida has apparently passed
legislation guaranteeing teachers the right, treated in the legislation as
a private constitutional right, to practice their religion by leading
prayers at school events.00 But at least most of the time teachers are
government employees and their speech on the job is government
speech that has nothing to do with their own constitutional rights.
The idea that a teacher leading a school assembly or a coach
instructing a football team is engaging in private speech is absurd and
certainly conflicts with Supreme Court precedent such as Rust v.
Sullivan.'o
100. Lauri Lebo, Florida Governor Signs Law Defending Educators' Right to Witness,
RELIGION DISPATCHES June 7, 2010, http://www.religiondispatches.org/ dispatcheslaurilebo/
2762/florida-goveor-signs_1aw-defending-educators%E2%80%99_rightjto-witness.
101. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
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The reason that these ideas about private speech go forward is
not that they are sensible in their own right; they would not be
defended outside the very special context of school prayer (if a public
school teacher wore a swastika in the classroom, for example, most
people would not regard it as protected private speech). Private
speech protections are offered as ways to get around unpopular
Establishment Clause holdings. If the interpretation of the
Establishment Clause were changed so that some sense of objective
morality could more easily be expressed in the public square, these
misguided efforts might end.
The issue of the treatment of student speech at graduations and
elsewhere is more difficult and is beyond my scope here. But even in
that context, most speech at school events should be subject to the
overriding demands of the school curriculum. That was certainly the
tendency of the Supreme Court in Morse v. Frederick," where the
Supreme Court upheld disciplinary action against a student for
advocating drug use off campus, albeit at a school sanctioned event.
A school board should be granted at least as much authority to
oversee student religious speech at an event such as a graduation at
which others will be unwillingly exposed to the content of the
student's speech.
V. The Effect of Seeking Common Ground onAmerican
Secularism
The public face of atheism in the United States today is
unrelenting attacks on religion. This is so in the realm of the
social/political where the New Atheists-writers such as Daniel
Dennett, Sam Harris, Victor Stenger, and Richard Dawkins-have
attacked religious belief as irrational and religious practice as violent
and dangerous. The titles of their work show their orientation
plainly: Breaking the Spell,o The End of Faith,'14 God: The Failed
Hypothesis"' and The God Delusion." The best-known of these
works and writers is Christopher Hitchens, whose book, God is not
Great and its vibrant subtitle-How Religion Poisons Everything
102. Morse v. Frederick,.551 U.S. 393 (2007).
103. DANIEL C. DENNETT, BREAKING THE SPELL (2006).
104. SAM HARRIS, THE END OF FAITH (2004).
105. VICTOR J. STENGER, GOD: THE FAILED HYPOTHESIS (2007).
106. DAWKINS, supra note 66.
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arrived with a best-selling bang in 2007 and really established the
New Atheism's anti-religion tone.
Legal academic work, on the other hand, is not as harshly anti-
religion by any means. In fact, express anti-religion rhetoric is rare-
Steven Gey might be the closest to an example." But, as I have
suggested elsewhere, impressionistically, many or perhaps most legal
academics in the field of church and state support a fairly strict
separation of church and state as well as government neutrality
toward religion and would, if it were politically feasible, support
removing religious imagery and symbols, such as the words "under
God" in the Pledge of Allegiance, from the public square."os
All of this has contributed to the "us-them" quality of the culture
wars in the United States. That landscape stretches from hot button
political issues, such as gay marriage and abortion, to symbolic
expression, such as House Resolution 131, which directed the
architect of the Capitol to engrave the Pledge of Allegiance and the
National Motto, "In God We Trust," in the Capitol Visitor Center.
The Resolution passed July 9, 2009, by a vote of 410 to 8, with 12
abstentions. The next day, the Senate passed the same resolution by
Unanimous Consent. *
One of the results of this religion divide is that it has been
difficult to create and sustain a broad-based progressive political
coalition that transcends religious differences. As Bethany Moreton,
the author of To Serve God and Wal-Mart,' put it in a recent
interview, "How far does the Left think it can get on economic justice
if it dismisses people's religious convictions as mere distractions or
false consciousness?,"'
Another result of the religion/secular divide is a kind of wooden
approach to Establishment Clause issues. Sometimes even the smell
of religion is enough to bring forth constitutional objections where
they could not possibly be appropriate. Perhaps the most extreme
example of this tendency occurred in Justice John Paul Stevens'
107. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Free Will, Religious Liberty, and a Partial Defense of the
French Approach to Religious Expression in Public Schools, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (2005).
108. See Bruce Ledewitz, Could Government Speech Endorsing a Higher Law Resolve
the Establishment Clause Crisis?, 41 ST. MARY'S L.J. 41, 59-62 (2009).
109. See GovTrack, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hc111-131 (last
visited June 18, 2010).
110. BETHANY MORETON, To SERVE GOD AND WAL-MART (2009).
111. "The Faithful Progressive Interview" (October 20, 2009), FAITHFUL
PROGRESSIVE, http://faithfulprogressive.blogspot.com/search?q=progressive+coalition
(last visited June 18,2010).
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partial concurrence in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,"2 in
which Justice Stevens stated that there was no "secular purpose" for a
legislative declaration that life begins at conception and thus the
statutory preamble violated the Establishment Clause,"' as if the
presence of new and unique DNA at conception defining a heretofore
unknown human entity could not possibly provide a secular
justification for legal protection. Justice Stevens was not even
looking at the actual motivations of the relevant state legislators as a
justification of his turn to religion."4 Without regard to whether such
anti-abortion laws are wise or fair, to call them religious is to exhibit
unique hostility toward religion.
In contrast, seeking common ground promises at least the
possibility of common starting points that might allow the formation
of new political alignments and might promote mutual understanding
across the religion/irreligion boundary. We don't have to live forever
with us/them thinking in the realm of church and state.
There is a fine example of what atheism looks like when it
acknowledges common ground with religion in terms of the
"universally human," in Andre Comte-Sponville's marvelous book,
The Little Book of Atheist Spirituality."' Comte-Sponville is a well-
known French philosopher and atheist, but he was raised as a
Christian and remains deeply appreciative of the Judeo-Christian
tradition. I cannot cite him as supporting the proposition that the
common ground we seek can lead to objective morality, for he
specifically states that morality is always relative;"' but his moral
commitments are so clear and his condemnation of nihilist post-
modernism so strong, that I am not sure that we disagree, despite
differing terminology.
In a section entitled "Can We Do Without Religion?", Comte-
Sponville expresses his common ground with Christians directly: "I
feel separated from you by only three days-those which, according to
tradition, separate Good Friday from Easter Sunday." If pressed, he
says, he could acknowledge virtually everything in the Gospels as
true, "apart from the good Lord."" And he writes movingly of Jesus:
112. Webster v. Reprod. Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
113. Id. at 566 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
114. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
115. ANDRE COMTE-SPONVILLE, THE LITILE BOOK OF ATHEIST SPIRITUALITY 39
(2006).
116. Id. at 45.
117. Id. at 63.
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For Spinoza, Jesus was merely a human being, but an
exceptional one-"the greatest of all philosophers," he once
called him-the one who best expressed the essence of
morality. And what might that be? What Spinoza calls "the
spirit of Christ," namely that for free spirits the only law is
"justice and charity," the only wisdom is love, and the only
virtue is to "do good and live in joy." Why should my atheism
prevent me from seeing the greatness of this message?'18
To see how this gracious openness to religion can help resolve
Establishment Clause issues, consider how Comte-Sponville might
respond to a case like Lee. Aside from the use of the word "God," to
which I will return in another section below, what would he think of
prayer on a public occasion? Because he does not fear religion, he is
able to consider the human need for ritual. He writes in the context
of funerals that they provide "a sorely needed ritual-a ceremony....
A human being can't be buried like an animal or burned like a log.""9
And not surprisingly, he feels the same way about prayer. He quotes
Simone Weil: "Love and prayer are merely the highest form of
attention." 120  His prayer is "addressed to no one and asks for
nothing" and he would prefer silence, but he is still open to prayer.
Comte-Sponville would not break human solidarity to complain
about the rewritten prayer I put into the mouth of the rabbi above.
Certainly Comte-Sponville would have no objection to a high
school course studying the greatness of human thought and belief in
order to discover the right way to live. He is much too open to think
that there is only one specific way to live. But he clearly believes the
way to be a human being is to live in honesty and courage,
communion and fidelity. I don't find very much difference between
Comte-Sponville and C. S. Lewis in their descriptions of basic
morality.
The anti-religion attitude of some secularists must end. It cannot
be true that the billions of human beings around the planet who are
religious believers are devoted to species of irrationality, hatred and
violence. Undoubtedly there is greatness in all of humankind's major
religious traditions. If atheists were open to that greatness then our
differences would not overwhelm our commonalities.
118. Id. at 33.
119. Id. at 9.
120. Id. at 143 (quoting Simon Weil).
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Of course the reverse is also true. Comte-Sponville addresses
this same message of unity to Christians on behalf of nonbelievers.
Speaking again of Jesus, now to the followers of Jesus, he asks, "is it
reasonable to lend more importance to the few days that separate us
than to the thirty-three preceding years, which-in their human
content, at least-bring us together?" 21
There is a modern group of atheists whom I denominate
secularists because of their openness to religion.1 22 I use the term
secularists partly because some members of this grouping use the
term God in describing reality. Comte-Sponville is not one of these.
But I would hesitate to use the word atheist for him also, simply
because the word has gained such negative connotation. What we can
learn from Comte-Sponville is not to be fearful that religion or non-
belief will gain some advantage. What we should worry about is how
our children are raised, what they believe in, and how well they love.
But now I must return to the world of division and rancor. For
the prayers in Lee did refer to God. So, to conclude my investigation
into the common ground, I must ask how religious imagery relates to
such common ground. Are graduation prayers addressed to God
constitutional?
VI. Religious Imagery and the Common Ground
We are at an odd point of popular consensus on the matter of
prayer at public school events. As the facts in Lee show, the school
board, undoubtedly accurately representing public opinion on this
point, instructed Rabbi Gutterman in effect that while God-language
could be used, nothing more sectarian than that should be in the
prayers. Ironically, these instructions were probably designed for
Christian clergy so that they would not use Christ language in
graduation prayers. Yet in Lee, it was a rabbi who ran afoul of the
Establishment Clause.
In the years since Lee was decided, this Judeo-Christian
consensus-that only God-language, and nothing more sectarian, is
appropriate-has undoubtedly become even more firmly entrenched
in our culture. In most places in the country, certainly most places
that have significant non-Christian populations, it is probably
accepted that prayer at public school events, should be nonsectarian.
121. Id. at 65.
122. See Bruce Ledewitz, The New New Secularism and the End of the Law of
Separation of Church and State, 28 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 1 (2009-2010).
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In practice, that usually means praying to God and not ending prayers
with the phrase, "through Jesus Christ, our Lord."
Non-Christians who have not grown up with Christian prayer
may not appreciate just how much of a sacrifice this so-called
nonsectarian prayer is for Christians. Theologically speaking,
Christians are not supposed to pray in this nonsectarian fashion. That
is why Rick Warren made a point of praying in Jesus' name at
President Barack Obama's inauguration.12 On the other hand, as if to
make up for this, Warren omitted the word "Christ" and invoked
both the Sh'ma-the ultimately traditional Jewish prayer-and the
Lord's Prayer, as Hebrew a prayer as a Christian could find. This was
all carefully put together, obviously, by Warren. All this theological
maneuvering just proves the point that even a conservative Christian
figure feels the pressure to engage in nonsectarian prayer on public
occasions.
Why has this tradition of nonsectarian prayer become so
widespread? One obvious reason is out of respect for other religions
in the Abrahamic tradition, originally the Jews and now also the
Muslims, neither of whom see Jesus as the Messiah, the Christ, let
alone as Lord.
If American discussion of church/state issues were more
respectful and less confrontational, the thoughtful atheist could ask
the following question of this nonsectarian consensus: "While I
appreciate that the Christian majority has accommodated non-
Christians to the extent of often avoiding references to Jesus Christ in
prayer on public occasions, I want to point out that the remaining
prayers to God, in whom I do not believe, are just as offensive to me
as references to the Christ would be to Jews and Muslims. So, I
would like to know why my feelings are not similarly taken into
account?" This question would not necessarily be a constitutional
one, but a matter of the courtesy of citizenship.
There are two kinds of answers to the atheist's hypothetical
question. One is historical and the other theological. One historical
123. I am speaking here of one-time events. When one tradition can be balanced
against another, as in daily legislative prayer, people may feel differently. There is also a
current challenge to formal nonsectarian restrictions on government employees who are
chaplains. See David Watters, Amendment Would Let Military Chaplains Pray as They
Wish, WASHINGTON POST, May 26, 2010, available at
http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/undergod/
2010/05/amendmentwould-let militarychaplains pray-as-they wish.html.
124. Pastor Warren Praying 'In Jesus Name' for Obama, WORTHY CHRISTIAN NEWS,
Jan. 20, 2009, http://www.worthynews.com/3996-rick-warrens-inaugural-prayer.
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response is the one favored by Justice Scalia, to the effect that history
and tradition have resolved religious references on public occasions in
favor of the God form of nonsectarian prayer. But with all due
respect to originalists, textualists and traditionalists, that is not how
most people think about the Constitution. Historical references
cannot turn off the continuing movement of history in this context
any more than they could serve to prevent protection of women
under Equal Protection. Obviously, our needs as a people change
over time and, as our nation becomes more secular, the same kind of
response that protected Jews years ago from sectarian Christian
religion might be thought now to require protection of atheists in a
similar way.
Another form of the history response would be to say that the
process of accommodation is ongoing and that eventually God-
language will be dropped from prayers on public occasions, either out
of judicial pressure or in a fully organic way. After all, the significant
presence of nonbelievers in the population is rather new. The
Christian majority might simply not have yet fully integrated the
feelings of this new group into its thinking.
Actually I am sure that this latter way of looking at things will
prove to be true, to some extent. Christians will begin to see the need
and appropriateness of accommodating the feelings of secularists.
But I believe that two theological responses to the atheist's
question will prove to be more important. The first is the possibility
that Jews, Muslims, and Christians may regard themselves as linked
and as worshiping the same God, so that accommodations are
justified. Atheists, on the other hand, may be regarded differently, to
an extent as enemies of God. Atheists may be regarded negatively to
a greater extent even than nonmonotheistic believers, such as
Buddhists and Hindus. If this is the feeling of a large part of the
Christian majority, and if government prayer policies are influenced
by this feeling, there is obviously a significant Equal Protection, as
well as Establishment Clause, problem.
I hope that a different theological perspective is driving the
current nonsectarian consensus. I hope that it rests on the
understanding that references to God are theologically distinct. One
way that prayer to God is distinct is that there is clearly a sense
among believers that to give up references to God on public occasions
would be to give up all contact with divine life. Even if nonsectarian
prayer is not fully satisfying, it at least does not do that.
But there is another theological point that I believe the Christian
majority intuits, which is that all claims about God, and all prayers to
86 [Vol. 38:1
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God, are only approximate. Even Comte-Sponville, whose atheism is
constitutive of his identity, points out that "[n]o one can say" what
God isl25 and that Einstein was correct to give this answer to the
question of his religious beliefs, "'First tell me what you mean by
God, and then I'll tell you if I believe in him."1
26
This problem of the definition of God, which is not a problem
merely of definition, became clear to me when I was reading both
Comte-Sponville and Richard Friedman's book, The Disappearance
of God, at the same time. These two thinkers are both sophisticated
and serious. They know what they are talking about when it comes to
religious matters. Nevertheless, Friedman criticizes Stephen
Hawking for "picturing a simple, traditional, notion of God: separate
from the universe" and for thinking that God had a freedom of choice
to create the universe differently or not at all.127 Such a sophisticated
view of nature but such a simplistic view of God, Friedman concludes.
Friedman rejects this view of God.
But this "simplistic" view is precisely the view of God that
Comte-Sponville takes, that God is "an eternal, spiritual and
transcendent being, both exterior and superior to nature, who
consciously and voluntarily created the universe."l 28 Friedman and
Comte-Sponville are just not talking about the same thing when they
speak of God.
The relevance of this insight that God-claims are only
approximate is that atheists who challenge God-language in public
prayers have never been required to identify the meaning of God to
which they object. The particular meaning of God, if identified,
would probably make a difference. For example, in defining God as
carefully as he does, Comte-Sponville is clearly suggesting that there
might in fact be definitions of God that he would accept. Just as one
example, Jerome Stone identifies an entire tradition of religious
naturalists, many of whom use the term God in ways that Comte-
Sponville would find congenial. 29
I am not claiming that the Christian majority is consciously
assuming that their God-language is not really offensive to atheists
because of the superior theological sophistication that atheists bring
125. COMTE-SPONVILLE, supra note 115, at 67.
126. Id. at 68.
127. RICHARD ELLIOTT FRIEDMAN, THE DISAPPEARANCE OF GOD 241 (1995).
128. COMTE-SPONVILLE, supra note 115, at 68.
129. STONE, supra note 9.
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to religious language. And none of this would matter if the atheist
could genuinely say, "I'm not sure what the word "God" means in
this or that prayer context, but there is no definition that I could
accept for God and therefore precise meaning does not matter. All
references to God by the government violate the Establishment
Clause."
But what if there were one definition of God that the atheist
does accept, or at least that so many atheists accept that its non-
acceptance is no longer seen as a religious matter? There is such an
understanding, a nonreligious understanding, of God.
Comte-Sponville quotes Nietzsche as follows:
What does nihilism mean? It means that the higher values have
depreciated; that the ends have vanished; that there is no
longer any answer to the question, "What's the use?"'3
Comte-Sponville required years to transform his atheism into a
satisfying response to Nietzsche. But ultimately he feels he
succeeded. What if the word "God" always means that the speaker
stands with Comte-Sponville on the other side of nihilism?
This would be a different form of civil religion than the type we
are used to, but I don't think the differences are that great. In the
Chapter "Civil Religion in America" in the 1970 book Beyond Belief,
Robert Bellah notes that ultimate sovereignty in America is
sometimes attributed to God, as in the national motto, "In God We
Trust" as well the "under God" language in the Pledge of
Allegiance.1' Bellah then answers the question, what difference it
makes to attribute sovereignty to God:
Though the will of the people as expressed in majority vote is
carefully institutionalized as the operative source of political
authority, it is deprived of an ultimate significance. The will of
the people is not itself the criterion of right and wrong. There
is a higher criterion in terms of which this will can be judged; it
is possible that the people may be wrong. The president's
obligation extends to the higher criterion.132
130. COMTE-SPONVILLE, supra note 115, at 203.
131. ROBERT N. BELLAH, BEYOND BELIEF 171 (1970).
132. Id.
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Trust in the real existence of a higher standard of right and
wrong is of course both a commitment to objective morality and a
rejection of nihilism. This trust is still expressed in God-language in
prayer on public occasions today. Those references to God still
contain the meaning that Bellah noted. Bellah's observations are all
the more significant because he was not writing about the
Establishment Clause. He was describing in good sociological fashion
what God-language means in context.
Steven Goldberg criticizes ideas along these lines as "Bleached
Faith," the title of his recent book." This way of thinking, this kind
of use of religious imagery, he writes, robs our religious traditions of
the genuine meaning of their language. He refers to the kind of
public invocation of God that Bellah describes as "the lowest
common denominator."M
But Goldberg misunderstands the religious traditions. Today, in
addition to their particular faith claims, all of our religions always also
embody a response to the great challenge of Nietzschian nihilism.
There is nothing bleached about using religious language in this way.
There is nothing merely ceremonial or merely historical about such
use. It is, at least on one level, what this religious language actually
does mean. God means in part an answer, or at least the promise of
the possibility of an answer, to the question, what's the use?
I am not denying that the speaker in Lee may have meant to
invoke the ontologically separate God, in which atheists like me do
not believe. But if I had asked Rabbi Gutterman whether he did not
also mean to stand in trust against the threat of meaninglessness that
is present in this age, undoubtedly he would have told me that he did.
Justice O'Connor once wrote that public use of God-language
does not violate the Establishment Clause because the word "God" is
the broadest word that we have to express something religious-a
tolerable attempt to acknowledge religion and to invoke its
solemnizing power without favoring any individual religious sect or
belief system.""' But of course the response to that defense to the
use of the word "God" would be that all religious expressions by
government potentially violate the Establishment Clause.
Justice O'Connor did not go far enough. It is not just that God is
the broadest religious expression we have, but that God is the
133. STEVEN GOLDBERG, BLEACHED FAITH (2008).
134. Id. at 100.
135. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 42 (2004) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment).
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broadest, and indeed the ultimate, expression of meaning for us today
and into the future. God is thus beyond religion. And since
meaningfulness is always implied by use of the word "God,"
challenges to God-language in public prayer should not lightly
assume division where there might be unity. God might end up as an
acceptable expression of our common ground, ironically whether God
exists or not.
Conclusion
Law professors, especially in the area of church and state, are so
strident that I sometimes wonder what they think they are doing
when they offer interpretations of the Constitution. It seems
sometimes like they are trying to win something. It seems that they
are engaging in a kind of zero sum politics in which the success of one
party must result in someone else's failure. If they win, someone
loses.
But the Constitution is not a game to be won or lost. It is an
expression of community. A successful interpretation of the
Constitution is one that fosters community. A failure of
constitutional interpretation is one that divides us. Even that self-
proclaimed textualist, Justice Scalia, counts public acceptance as a
great strength of his asserted constitutional method."
I admit that there are times when constitutional justice requires
division and not community. That great consensus builder, Charles
Black, once wrote that whites would just have to adapt to Brown v.
Board of Education.137 Perhaps the same thing is true today with
regard to issues such as gay marriage.
But that is emphatically not the case with regard to morality and
religious imagery in the public square under the Establishment
Clause. In this context we still have the opportunity of forging bonds
of community around our religious and nonreligious identities. I am
asking in this paper only that we attempt to do that before trying to
force our fellow citizens into, or out of, their religious or nonreligious
commitments.
136. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1000 (Scalia
J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part) ("As long as this Court thought (and the
people thought) that we Justices were doing essentially lawyers' work up here-reading
text and discerning our society's traditional understanding of that text-the public pretty
much left us alone.").
137. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 Yale L.J.
421, 429 (1960).
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